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INTRODUCTION
A ctive labour market programmes (ALMPs) aim to place the unemployed and otherdisadvantaged groups into paid employment and have been the subject of muchacademic research. However, themajority of studies have been in the domain of social
policy, rather than human resource management (HRM). Despite employers being critical to
their success, most studies have focused on the supply side of these interventions (jobseekers),
but more recently, a subset of social policy and HRM literature has begun to explore the
demand side (employers) and, more specifically, employer participation and ‘employer
engagement’ in ALMPs (McGurk, 2014; van Berkel and van der Aa, 2014; Ingold and Stuart,
2015; Bredgaard and Halkjær, 2016). ALMPs are conceived at the institutional level of
government and delivered at regional and local levels by agencies positioned between
employers and jobseekers, including the public employment service (PES) and private and
non-profit organisations. ALMPs can offer employers a channel for recruiting labour that has
the potential to enhance workforce diversity and competitive advantage and to contribute to
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‘corporate social responsibility’ (or ‘social responsibility’) (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). We
conceptualise agencies delivering ALMPs as labour market intermediaries (LMIs) that can
assume specific HR functions. In so doing,we focus on the underexplored dimension of the role
of ALMP agencies as LMIs that can facilitate employers’ recruitment of disadvantaged groups
(short-term unemployed, long-term unemployed, lone parents, disabled people and young
people).
In this article, we draw on surveys of employers in the UK and Denmark (considered
pioneers of ALMPs) to estimate whether ALMP agencies elevate the likelihood of employers
hiring from disadvantaged groups. We utilise the conceptual framework of ‘information
provider’ and ‘matchmaker’ LMIs of Bonet et al. (2013) based on the HR functions they fulfil.
This framework predicts that ALMP agencies as LMIs will reconfigure employers’ recruitment
patterns in a way that is conducive to the employment of unemployed and other
disadvantaged groups. In order to test this proposition, our study examined how ALMPs fare
in the UK and Denmark compared with internal organisational factors that shape employers’
approaches to recruitment (firm size and selection criteria). This permits a critical analysis of
ALMPs, drawing attention to how ALMP agencies could augment or even modify employers’
recruitment practices to promote the recruitment of disadvantaged groups.
A key finding from our study is that the effect of ALMPs on the likelihood of hiring
disadvantaged groups is at best moderate. Once firm size is included in the model,
accounting for the fact that larger firms are more likely to hire employees from
disadvantaged groups, the size of the effect of ALMPs decreases substantially. While ALMPs
marginally increased the probability of employers recruiting the long-term unemployed in
both countries and lone parents and disabled people in Denmark, the effect was not
sufficiently strong to offset the negative impact of employers’ selection criteria. We thus argue
that ALMP agencies as ‘information provider’ LMIs have the potential to increase employers’
recruitment of disadvantaged groups, but this is constrained by their inability to act
effectively as ‘matchmaker’ LMIs and to overcome rigid intra-organisational barriers to such
recruitment.
The following sections critically review the existing literature relating, firstly, to labour
market intermediaries and, secondly, in relation to the impact of firm size and selective hiring
on the recruitment of disadvantaged groups. The methods and study variables are introduced,
followed by the results and discussion and conclusions, including the implications for policy
and practice.
THEORISING ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMME AGENCIES AS LABOUR MARKET
INTERMEDIARIES
Labour market intermediaries mediate between the individual worker and the employing
organisation in a three-way triangular relationship (Forde, 2008). A growing literature
recognises LMIs as an increasingly important phenomenon for organisations’ recruitment,
particularly when compared with the historical dominance of the PES as a national labour
exchange and job matching function (Bonet et al., 2013: 353). However, to date little attention
has been paid to the growing number of contemporary, and often competing, private and
non-profit ALMP delivery organisations (hereafter referred to as ‘agencies’) funded by public
expenditure. The following section briefly sets out the ALMPs contexts in the UK and
Denmark before reviewing the literature on LMIs and introducing our conceptual
framework.
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Active labour market programmes in the UK and Denmark
Both the UK and Denmark are considered to be pioneers of ALMPs (Bonoli, 2010), and despite
some differences (such as the role of social partnership in Danish labour market policy), both
countries are characterised by flexible labourmarketswith relatively lax labourmarket regulation.
At the time of our employer survey, both had similar rates of unemployment, as Denmark was
adversely affected by the financial crisis compared with its Nordic neighbours (OECD, 2016).
In the 1990s, both the UK and Danish governments intensified the use of ALMPs (known
respectively as ‘welfare to work’ and ‘activation’) to increase the employment of groups
receiving social security benefits who experience difficulties in finding work. The UK’s
dominant ALMP approach since the 1990s has been ‘work first’, focused on the quickest (re-)
insertion into work. In the UK in the early 2000s, the government contracted private and
non-profit agencies to deliver ALMPs. This has since intensified, leading to the dominance of
large private sector agencies, including private recruitment agencies, and a relatively minimal
role for the PES (Jobcentre Plus), which largely deals with the short-term unemployed. Specific
groups are assigned to the caseloads of contracted agencies, predominantly maintaining
contact with the PES to comply with benefit eligibility requirements. The most prominent
programme since 2011 has been the ‘Work Programme’ (for the long-term unemployed, young
people at risk of long-term unemployment and disabled people assessed as ‘fit for work’). The
programme is underpinned by a ‘payment by results’ fundingmodel that rewards agencies for
placing the unemployed into ‘sustainable employment’ (DWP, 2011; Rubery et al., 2016), and
agencies adopt ‘black box’ strategies to achieve this, with little prescription from government.
In Denmark, from 2007, employment policy and the delivery of ALMPs was devolved
to municipalities, accompanied by the introduction of municipal-controlled Jobcenters. This
effectively dismantled the national PES and coincided with large-scale mandatory
contracting-out of ALMPs (Larsen, 2013). The latter has been reduced but municipalities retain
autonomy over the extent and nature of contracted activities. During the 2000s, the emphasis of
ALMPs shifted from a focus on upskilling, training and education towards a more ‘work first’
approach, whereby the unemployed were required to participate in repeated ‘activation’.
Following a government labour market commission in 2014, emphasis has been placed on
‘meaningful activation’, and the most prominent programmes are Løntilskud (jobs with wage
subsidies) and Virksomhedspraktik (company-based placements).
This article conceptualises the ALMP agencies that stand between jobseekers and employers
as LMIs, and the next section explores this further, in particular the concepts of ‘information
provider’ and ‘matchmaker’ LMIs of Bonet et al. (2013).
Active labour market programme agencies as labour market intermediaries
Most studies of LMIs focus on private recruitment or ‘temporary help’ agencies (Autor, 2009;
Bonet et al., 2013) and on executive recruitment and headhunting (Coverdill and Finlay, 1998).
Although Bonet et al. (2013: 384) acknowledge a gap in the academic understanding of LMIs,
surprisingly few studies have paid attention to ALMP agencies, or conceptualised them as
LMIs (Gore, 2005; Osterman, 2008; and McGurk, 2014 are exceptions). This section draws on
the HRM literature relating to LMIs and explains why the conceptual framework of Bonet et al.
(2013) is useful for studying the role of ALMP agencies as LMIs in employers’ recruitment of
disadvantaged groups in the UK and Denmark.
The core defining element of LMIs is that they assume basic aspects of HRM that employers
otherwise perform themselves (Bonet et al., 2013: 347). Attempts have beenmade to explain and
to categorise LMIs and their activities. Benner’s (2003) study of Silicon Valley LMIs grouped
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them into private sector firms, membership associations and public sector agencies, dividing
the latter into workforce development ‘system’ institutions linking disadvantaged workers to
employment; providers of adult education and job training for employers; and community and
non-profit organisations engaged in job training and placement activities (pp. 624–5). Benner
argued that LMIs perform three functions for employees and employers: reducing transaction
costs;managing risks associatedwith volatile economic change; and helping to build social and
business networks (p. 622). By examining programmatic interventions in the demand side of
the labour market, including LMIs, Osterman (2008) distinguished three types: ‘passive’
intermediaries that act as bulletin boards to provide ‘matching’ services for employers and
jobseekers; ‘more ambitious’ intermediaries that attempt to find or to train employees to fill
employers’ job orders (see alsoMcGurk, 2014); and more ‘creative intermediaries’ that provide
a range of services to employers, including ‘HR consulting’ to improve job quality and to
provide training and placements (p. 29). Osterman’s framework provides for a potentially
granular analysis of the activities of ALMP agencies as LMIs. Similarly, the taxonomy of Bonet
et al. (2013: 342) is based on the three main attributes of HR practices that LMIs perform:
‘information providers’, ‘matchmakers’, ‘administrators’. This provides a useful categorization
that is underpinned by an analysis of how LMI involvement in employers’ HRM functions
alters the way that they are performed and how they can, in turn, affect employment outcomes
(p. 348), such as jobseekers’ access to employment. Given that ALMP agencies in the UK and
Denmark tend not to act as ‘administrators’ by directly employing workers, this article focuses
on the information provider andmatchmaker categories. Belowwe discuss how employers can
utilise these LMIs and their potential impact on employers’ HRM functions.
Both employers and employees possess imperfect and often asymmetrically distributed
information about the other party (Akerlof, 1970; Larsen and Vesan, 2012) that can adversely
impact on the effectiveness of the recruitment process. ‘Information providers’ aggregate, package
and convey information about individuals to organisations and about vacancies to individuals
(Autor, 2009). A prominent example of information providers is online job boards (Bonet et al.,
2013: 348), reflective of the digitalisation of contemporary vacancy-placing (ParryandWilson, 2009;
Cappelli, 2012). A key development in the PES in both the UK and Denmark is the replacement of
manual vacancy-placement with self-service digitalised job boards (Universal Jobmatch in the
former, Jobnet in the latter). However, effective utilisation of such tools relies on the skills of both
employers and jobseekers (Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004), and also potentially on the additional input
of LMIs. For disadvantaged jobseekers, information providers can fill gaps caused by absent
networks or social contacts (Granovetter, 1995) and they can increase the visibility of employers’
vacancies. Employers can use information provider LMIs to reduce their transaction costs of
obtaining sufficient information about candidates, including more in-depth information about a
wider, more diverse pool (Bonet et al., 2013: 351). Information providers can thus bring to
the attention of employers disadvantaged candidates who would otherwise be overlooked.
Employers can also utilise ‘matchmaker’ LMIs to assume the HR functions of the
recruitment, selection and promotion of candidates (Bonet et al., 2013: 354). Beyond basic
information provision, matchmakers can oversee the entire process of matching jobseekers and
employers, supplying information on both parties, mediating between the two and in many
cases guaranteeing the quality of placements (Bonet et al., 2013: 354). Matchmakers are likely to
have access to a larger and more diverse pool of candidates and to hold more accurate
information about them than information providers because they collect or check information
themselves (Bonet et al., 2013: 354–5). Employers can be guided by matchmakers regarding
which candidates to consider, withmatchmakers acting as a first filter and effectively screening
candidates according to their true quality (p. 356). Arguably, the risk of losing potential repeat
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business from employers means that matchmakers have an incentive to ensure good matches
between jobseekers and employers. However, this is contested in the LMI literature (Bonet et al.,
2013: 355). Additionally, Larsen andVesan (2012: 468–9) have argued that the PES in fact has an
incentive to conceal candidates’ actual quality from employers, in order to expedite the
placement of disadvantaged candidates into employment. Paradoxically, this can backfire,
leading to employers assuming that candidates routed through the PES (or ALMP agencies)
are ‘lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970) of uncertain (and likely low) quality because the PES is
considered to be a last resort for weaker job candidates (Larsen and Vesan, 2012).
Active labour market programme agencies as matchmaker LMIs can potentially assist the
unemployed to bypass employers’ ‘ordinary recruitment processes’ that may disadvantage
them (Quinto Romani and Larsen, 2010) in two ways. Firstly, they can offer employability
interventions tomove disadvantaged groups into, or closer to, the labourmarket. Secondly, they
can build relationships with employers. Employability interventions include pre-employment
training in conjunction with employers; job search activities; CV writing; interview skills; work
trials orwork experience that allowemployers to ‘test drive’ (Akerlof, 1970) potential employees
and allow candidates to obtain ‘realistic job previews’ (Barber, 1998); through to subsidised jobs;
mentoring; in-work support and developing employers’ future workforce strategies. ALMP
agencies have growing ‘employer engagement’ functions, which in the UK includes former
private recruitment sector personnel (Ingold and Stuart, 2014). To conclude, for employers the
potential role of ALMP agencies as LMIs is twofold: as information providers, they provide
employers with more precise information about candidates; as matchmakers they can bridge
the gap between employers and candidates, bring to employers’ attention candidates that are
not on their radar and reducing the risk of employing candidates who are less ‘job-ready’.
Hypothesis 1: ALMP agencies, acting as labour market intermediaries, increase the likelihood of
employers hiring employees from disadvantaged groups through ALMPs.
Organisational determinants of recruitment and selection
Two organisational factors are considered as important determinants of employers’
recruitment and selection of disadvantaged groups: firm size and selection criteria. By
definition, large firms are bundles of resources (Penrose, 1959) that employ large numbers of
people and potentially have more capacity to employ from disadvantaged, as well as non-
disadvantaged, groups. This is probabilistically true, as, other things being equal, the more
people that employers hire, the more likely that amongst them will be disadvantaged
candidates. There exists a wealth of empirical evidence to support this proposition. Martin
(2004) found that significant factors in employers’ participation in ALMPs were firm size and
the concomitant size of their HR departments. A study by Atkinson et al. (1996) suggests that
large employers (over 250 employees) were the most active recruiters in general and that their
likelihood of recruiting the unemployed was higher (and higher still for public sector
employers). By the same token, McGurk (2014) has argued that the strongest forms of
‘employer engagement’ in ALMPs were by medium-to-large employers, who supplemented
their HR functions with the services of ALMP agencies. The evidence is not entirely
unequivocal though, as in a recent survey of Swiss employers (Bonoli, 2014), large companies
conversely demonstrated a negative predisposition to employing the long-term unemployed.
Additionally, some studies have emphasised the potential of small and medium sized
businesses (SMEs) to increase the employment of disadvantaged groups (e.g. Storey, 1994).
Based on longitudinal analysis of the UK Labour Force Survey, Urwin and Buscha (2012) have
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argued that SMEs are critical to assisting the unemployed and disadvantaged into work, as
such groups comprise a larger proportion of SMEs’ recruitment, either through small business
start-ups or becoming an SME employee (p. 20). Empirical evidence, however, does not
support such an optimistic assertion. Numerous studies have found that only a fraction of
SMEs had recruited from the UKWork Programme (CIPD, 2012; Shury et al., 2014; Ingold and
Stuart, 2015). Similarly, Blackburn and Ram (2006) have asserted that assumptions about small
businesses improving the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups are fundamentally flawed,
partly due to the heterogeneity of the small business population.
Hypothesis 2: Large organisations are more likely to hire from disadvantaged groups than small and
medium enterprises.
Another relevant determinant of employers’ recruitment is selection criteria, or selective
hiring. The orthodox view of the hiring process purports that formalised practices can promote
the recruitment of disadvantaged groups by helping to reduce the scope for personal
judgements and prejudice that can result in discrimination. However, in reality the opposite
can occur (Jewson and Mason, 1986), as the selection process is by definition a series of acts of
discrimination (Ramsay and Scholarios, 1999; Lockyer and Scholarios, 2004; Noon, 2012). Its
discriminatory nature stems from the bifurcation of the selection process into suitability and
acceptability criteria (Jenkins, 1986). The former focus on the technical and functionally specific
criteria for job performance outlined in the job description, evidenced by qualifications, CVs or
answers to interview questions (Noon, 2012: 79). Acceptability criteria relate to more subjective
aspects based on personal judgements, such as person-organisation ‘fit’ (Kristof-Brown et al.,
2005), or the notion of the ‘best candidate’ for the job (Noon, 2012).
Using these criteria, employers scrutinise candidates’ qualities alongside their subjective fit
with the organisation based onwork ethic, motivation and attitudes (Jewson andMason, 1986).
As a result, organisations can (sometimes inadvertently) discriminate against candidates based
on group characteristics such as age, gender and ethnicity (Tomaskovic-Devy and Skaggs,
1999) and individual characteristics (Spence, 1973) as this can allow employers to quickly filter
large numbers of applications. Long or repeated spells of unemployment may signify to
employers atrophying skills or a lack of motivation (Atkinson et al., 1996; Bonoli and Hinrichs,
2010; Larsen and Vesan, 2012), unreliability or a lack of productivity (Bonoli and Leichti, 2014).
Likewise, employers may exercise judgements about specific groups, for example, perceiving
lone parents to be unreliable, to lack flexibility or to have insufficient work experience or low
skills (Holzer, 1999; Connors and Thomas, 2014). Younger workers may be disadvantaged
because of their perceived lack of skills andwork experience (Snape and Redman, 2003; Loretto
and White, 2006). Indeed there is an overt inconsistency between employers’ claims to be
positively disposed to employing disabled people and low employment rates for this group
(Burke et al., 2013). Additionally, disadvantaged candidates who meet employers’ suitability
criteria may still be disproportionately affected by subjective acceptability criteria, which can
amplify minor differences and signals (Brooks et al., 2009).
Hypothesis 3: The importance employers attach to selection criteria in the recruitment process is
negatively associated with the likelihood of employers hiring from disadvantaged groups.
Through the supply-side and demand-side interventions described earlier, ALMP agencies
have potentially critical roles to play in addressing barriers to employment that are manifest in
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the selective hiring process. On the supply side, they can provide interventions to address low
skills and a lack of qualifications or work experience and to help improve CV writing and
interview skills. On the demand side, employer engagement staff inALMPagencies can attempt
to intervene in (or shortcut) the selection process in order to prioritise their candidates (Ingold
and Stuart, 2014). These LMIs thus have the potential to alter employers’ own selective hiring
practices, or to replace them entirely (Bonet et al., 2013: 346). That is to say, although selective
hiring restricts the recruitment of disadvantaged groups by filtering out such candidates,
ALMP agencies as LMIs have the potential to mitigate this effect, or even overcome it.
Hypothesis 4: ALMP agencies moderate the relationship between selection criteria and the likelihood
of employers hiring from disadvantaged groups, such that higher rates of recruitment through
ALMPs mitigate the negative effect of recruitment selection criteria on the likelihood of hiring from
disadvantaged groups.
Figure 1 shows the conceptual model for the study. It lays out Hypotheses 1–4 as direct
effects of independent variables (ALMP as agencies as LMIs, firm size, selection criteria) on the
likelihood of hiring from disadvantaged groups. Hypothesis 4 is presented as an interaction
effect between selection criteria and the role of ALMP agencies as LMIs, assuming the latter
impinges on the negative relationship between selection criteria and the probability of hiring
employees from disadvantaged groups.
METHODS
Sample
This article draws on data from an original establishment-level survey of employers in the UK
and Denmark that was the first phase of a larger research project analysing employer
engagement in ALMPs in both countries. The sample was random and nationally
FIGURE 1 Conceptual model
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representative of the business universes in each country, covering all sectors of the economy,
geography and size (firms with more than 10 employees in the UK and more than five in
Denmark). Fieldwork was undertaken between December 2014 and February 2015 with the
person responsible for recruitment, using computer-assisted telephone interviewing. There
were 1,003 complete responses in the UK (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland)
and 500 in Denmark; the smaller sample size in Denmark reflected the significantly smaller
business universe. Response rates were 12 per cent respectively, which is appropriate for a
survey of this design and scale. The business populations in the country samples were similar,
formed largely by private enterprises, with a formal approach to recruitment.
Analysis
The regression equation corresponding to the conceptual model (Figure 1) is as follows.
Logit ln
ρ
1 ρ
  
¼ αþ ϑϕþ θχ þ φγþ τψ
where α – intercept; ϕ , χ, γ, and ψ signify independent variables (firm size, selection criteria,
employers’ recruitment through ALMPs and the interaction effect of the two latter variables),
with ψ = χ*γ; ϑ,θ, φ and τ are regression coefficients for the respective predictors. Dependent
variables signify the probability of employers hiring from disadvantaged groups in the labour
market, taking values from zero to one.We employ logistic regression to execute the preceding
equation.
Measures
Consistent with the existing literature, the study variables were measured by both categorical
(dichotomous and ordinal) and continuous variables. The dependent variable (the likelihood of
employers hiring from disadvantaged groups) was measured by five dichotomous variables.
Respondents were asked whether in the past 2 years their organisations had hired at least one
employee from the following groups: the short-term unemployed (up to 6 months), the long-
term unemployed (over 6 months), lone parents, disabled people and young people. The
answers ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ were coded ‘0’ and ‘1’, respectively.
Independent variableswere captured by categorical and continuous variables. Firm sizewas
a dichotomous variable, separating SMEs (up to 250 employees) from large organisations
(more than 250 employees). Firm size ought to be treated with caution, as this categorical
variable does not allow us to assess the share of workers from disadvantaged groups in the
firm’s workforce. The analysis conducted is thus restricted to the fact that larger firms are more
likely at any point in time to hire employees from disadvantaged groups than SMEs, as such
firms have access to a wider pool of candidates. Firm size in ourmodel is not, in its own right, a
central predictor, but it serves as a yardstick of ALMPs’ performance as an amplifier of the
probability of hiring employees from disadvantaged groups.
Following Jenkins (1986), employers’ selection criteria were operationalised by five five-
point Likert-type variables to reflect technical and functionally specific criteria for job
performance: relevant work experience; job-specific skills; literacy, numeracy and IT skills; and
qualifications. A composite index of selection criteria was computed, owing to the fact that the
foregoing scale was internally consistent (Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.743 in a merged sample;
α = 0.734 in the UK sample and α = 0.754 in the Danish sample). The resulting variable thus
captures the importance of selection criteria in employers’ recruitment.
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The key independent variable (employers’ recruitment through ALMPs) was the ratio of
employees hired from all types of ALMPs to the total number of vacancies placed by employers
in the past 2 years. While the data did not allow comparison of the effects of the specific roles of
ALMP agencies as LMIs, it nevertheless permitted testing of a fundamental proposition behind
Hypothesis 1: that employers’ recruitment through ALMPs is beneficial for disadvantaged
groups in the labour market. The resulting variable signified the percentage occupied by
ALMPs in employers’ overall recruitment. Thismeasurement reflects the relative importance of
ALMP agencies as LMIs, the assumption being that the higher the share of ALMPs in
employers’ recruitment, the more likely employers are to recruit from disadvantaged groups.
An interaction effect of recruitment through ALMPs and selection criteria was operationalised
by first mean-centring these variables and then multiplying them. The resulting interaction
term was plunged in the regression equation to capture the τψ component.
Owing to the dichotomous nature of the hypothesised dependent variables, five
independent logistic regressions were performed. Regression models were executed
hierarchically, such that recruitment selection criteria and firm size were entered into the
equation first. Model fit was estimated by Akaike Information Criterion and Nagelkerke R
square. Thereafter, employers’ recruitment fromALMPs and its interaction effect with selection
criteria were added to the model and fit indices were evaluated again.
Statistical models reported were controlled for sector (public and private), employee
coverage by collective agreements (dichotomous variable identifying whether employees are
covered by workplace collective agreements); level of decision-making authority for
participation in ALMPs; organisations’ overall approach to recruitment and industry (service
sector comparedwithmanufacturing, primary sector, retailing and IT). This reflects a variety of
factors that might impact on employers’ propensity for hiring employees from disadvantaged
groups (Martin, 2004; Ingold and Valizade, 2015).
Descriptive statistics for all study variables including frequencies, means and standard
deviations are reported in Table 1. Statistical analysis was executed in the R software
environment for statistical programming.
RESULTS
Employers’ recruitment of disadvantaged groups through active labour market programmes
This section presents descriptive statistics for the UK and Denmark regarding employers’
recruitment of disadvantaged groups through ALMPs. Figure 2 shows the percentage of
employers in both countries that had recruited at least one employee from the five
disadvantaged groups. Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the share of
employers that had hired employees from disadvantaged groups was higher in the UK across
all groups but the differences between the two countries were variable, ranging from 14.7 per
cent for recruitment of the long-term unemployed to 24.3 per cent for hiring young people.
Secondly, the patterns of recruitmentwere similar between the two countries, in that employers
in the UK and Denmark were more likely to hire young people (90.7 per cent of UK employers
and 66.4 per cent of Danish employers had recruited young people in the past 2 years).
Employers in both countries exhibited a lower propensity to hire disabled people: only 50.4
per cent of employers in the UK had hired at least one disabled person in the past 2 years
and just 33.7 per cent in Denmark.
Our descriptive statistics for employers’ use ofALMPs for recruitment and selection (and, by
extension, their use of ALMP agencies) demonstrated a striking similarity between the two
countries. Table 1 shows that the percentage of employers that had placed a minimum of one
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vacancy with the PES in the past 2 years was almost identical between the two countries (49.7
per cent of organisations in theUK and 47.5 per cent inDenmark). Employerswere asked about
their involvement in specific programmes aimed at assisting disadvantaged groups into work
(such as theWork Programme in the UK and Virksomhedspraktik in Denmark). Overall, 72.8 per
cent of employers in the UK and 78.4 per cent in Denmark had participated in at least one
ALMP in the past 2 years (Table 1). However, participation did not translate into actual
recruitment through ALMPs. Figure 3 shows the density function of the recruitment variable,
demonstrating that a majority of employers (82.6 per cent in the UK and 67.1 per cent in
Denmark) had an exact zero rate of recruitment from ALMPs as a share of the total number
of vacancies placed in the past 2 years. The probability density function of employers’
recruitment throughALMPs resembles a negative binomial distribution, butwith visible spikes
TABLE 1 Study variables
Auxiliary variables not included in regression analysis (categorical dichotomous)
UK
Percentage
Denmark
Percentage
Vacancy placement with PES 49.7 47.5
Participation in ALMPs 72.8 78.4
Control variables (categorical dichotomous)
Collective agreement (whether employees are covered by collective agreements) 15.6 56.6
Sector (private) 67.4 53.7
Decision-making (local managers are not involved) 87.6 73.2
Approach to recruitment (written or formal guidelines) 81.2 71.2
Industry (Business, social services and public administration) 73.1 76.2
Independent variables
Categorical dichotomous
Firm size (large – more than 250 employees) 18.7 8.8
Ordinal and continuous
UK
Mean/SD
Denmark
Mean/SD
Selection criteria (how important are the following when applicants apply for roles in your organisation)
Relevant work experience 3.74/1.06 4.02/0.98
Job-specific skills 3.99/0.99 4.21/0.90
Qualification level 3.46/1.12 4.33/0.82
Literacy and numeracy skills 3.95/0.99 3.35/1.10
IT skills 3.21/1.17 3.28/1.18
ALMP agencies as LMIs (share of employees recruited through ALMPs in total number of vacancies placed in the past 2 years)
Employers’ recruitment through ALMPs 0.05/0.18 0.13/0.27
Dependent variables (categorical dichotomous)
UK
Percentage
Denmark
Percentage
Recruitment from disadvantaged groups (whether employers had recruited at least one person from the following groups)
Short-term unemployed 75.7 59.7
Long-term unemployed 61.0 46.3
Lone parents 73.5 52.3
Disabled people 50.4 33.7
Young people 90.7 66.4
Sample size: UK – 1003; Denmark – 500. Frequencies are reported for categorical variables, measures of central tendency and
dispersion (mean and standard deviation) – for continuous variables.
PES, public employment service; ALMPs, active labour market programmes; LMIs, labour market intermediaries.
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inDenmark comparedwith a nearly flat line in theUK. InDenmark, the function hikes towards
the right tail of the distribution, signifying a sizeable proportion of employers that in their
recruitment activities extensively relied on ALMP agencies. In summary, the descriptive
statistics raise the question as to whether an exponential increase in recruitment through
ALMPs increases the likelihood of employers hiring from disadvantaged groups. This
proposition is reflected in the conceptual model (Figure 1) and was examined through
regression analysis.
Hypotheses testing
The hypotheses for the study were tested by five logistic regressions performed on country
subsamples in relation to the five disadvantaged groups. Table 2 contains detailed statistical
outputs, including raw regression coefficients (logarithm of odds – Logit (π)), z values and
significance levels. Marginal effects at the means are reported for statistically significant
independent variables.Marginal effects for firm size indicate how the predicted probabilities of
hiring from disadvantaged groups change amongst large organisations, comparedwith SMEs.
In relation to employers’ selection criteria and recruitment fromALMPs, marginal effects show
an instantaneous rate of change that corresponds to a change in the probability of hiring from
disadvantaged groups because of a unit increase in these continuous independent variables. Fit
indices are reported for each step in the regression analysis. Firstly, predictors not related to
FIGURE 2 Recruitment of employees from disadvantaged groups
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ALMPs were added into the regression equation alongside control variables; thereafter,
employers’ recruitment through ALMPs and a moderation effect were added. The table is
presented to make these steps clearly distinguishable.
Hypothesis 1 was supported only partially, in that employers’ recruitment through ALMPs
was positively associatedwith the likelihood of hiring the long termunemployed in theUK and
Denmark (Logit (π) = 0.373 and 0.307 respectively at ρ < 0.05 and ρ < 0.01). In addition,
recruitment from ALMPs in Denmark was positively associated with the likelihood of hiring
lone parents and disabled people, with Logit (π) = 0.210 and 0.209 at ρ < 0.05. Although
recruitment from ALMPs demonstrated statistically significant effects, judging from the fit
FIGURE 3 Employers’ recruitment through ALMPs
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indices and marginal effects alike, it was a far less important predictor of recruitment from
disadvantaged groups than other independent variables. Hypothesis 2 was fully supported,
as large enterprises in the UK and Denmark elevated the likelihood of hiring from all
disadvantaged groups in question. Logit (π) values were statistically significant, as indicated in
Table 2. According to the marginal effects, the likelihood of hiring from disadvantaged groups
was substantially higher amongst large organisations comparedwith SMEs,with an increase in
probability for large organisations within the range 16.4 per cent to 49.1 per cent in the UK and
8.4 per cent to 45.6 per cent in Denmark.We also found partial support forHypothesis 3, in that
selection criteria were negatively associated with the likelihood of hiring the short-term and
long-term unemployed in the UK (Logit (π) = 0.443 and 0.537 at ρ < 0.01 and ρ < 0.001,
respectively) and the likelihood of hiring young people in Denmark (Logit (π) = 0.444 at
ρ < 0.01). There was no statistically significant relationship between selection criteria and the
likelihood of hiring from other disadvantaged groups in both countries. Lastly, we found no
support for Hypothesis 4 relating to ALMP agencies as LMIs because of the absence of a
statistically significant interaction effect between recruitment from ALMPs and employers’
selection criteria.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we analysed data from comparative surveys of employers in the UK and
Denmark to estimate whether ALMPs increased the likelihood of employers hiring from
disadvantaged groups, compared with firm size and the importance employers attach to
selection criteria. Drawing on the conceptual framework of ALMP agencies of Bonet et al.
(2013) as information provider and matchmaker LMIs, we suggest possible explanations for
our findings. In our study, we treat the effect of firm size on employers’ likelihood of recruiting
disadvantaged groups with some caution. Existing studies (Peck and Theodore, 2000) have
rightly critiqued supply-sided ALMPs for their lack of attention to employers’ demand.
However, ALMP agencies may have brought vacancies in large firms to the attention of
disadvantaged candidates and channelled candidates to employers who could accommodate
large volumes of employees (Ingold and Stuart, 2015). This process seems likely to have
increased disadvantaged candidates’ probability of becoming employed. That around half of
the employers in each country had placed vacancies with the online job boards operated by
the PES suggests that, in contrast to the claim of Larsen and Vesan’s (2012) that the PES will
always fail, ALMP agencies may have had some success by operating predominantly as
information providers. These LMIs may have capitalised on employers’ demand for labour
and possible higher turnover and captured a share of their recruitment of both disadvantaged
and non-disadvantaged groups.
The negative effect of selection criteria on employers’ likelihood of recruiting disadvantaged
groups supports extant research (Noon, 2012), but their impact on the short-term unemployed
(who tend to be considered job-ready) as well as the long-term unemployed in the UK and
young people in Denmark suggests a more negative picture than existing studies (Atkinson
et al., 1996; Bonoli, 2014). This may reflect employers increasing their threshold hiring criteria
to filter out candidates in the reasonably slack labour market context at the time of the survey.
While ALMPs marginally increased the probability of hiring from disadvantaged groups –
including increasing the likelihood of employers recruiting the long-term unemployed in the
UK and lone parents in Denmark – they were not capable of counteracting the negative impact
of selective hiring. Disabled people featured prominently in terms of significance levels only in
Denmark, but in both countries, recruitment from this group was much lower than other
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disadvantaged groups, suggesting that there are significant barriers to their employment
(Burke et al., 2013). Although the LMI literature suggests that ALMP agencies have the potential
to increase employers’ recruitment of disadvantaged groups, this is constrained if they act as
basic ‘information provider’ LMIs. ALMP agencies’ inability to act effectively as ‘matchmaker’
LMIs leads to a failure to overcome rigid intra-organisational barriers to such recruitment.
Tailoring of employability services provided by ALMP agencies to employers (and
jobseekers) has been a stated policy objective of their contracting out in the UK to private and
non-profit agencies (DWP, 2011). However, our comparative data show striking similarities for
the differing institutional context of Denmark, where contracting out has been significantly
reduced. This suggests that in neither country have ALMP agencies as LMIs assumed
matchmaker functions for employers. For ALMP agencies to assume such a function requires
much better engagement with employers beyond mere information provision that largely
involves online job boards. There is potential for ALMP agencies as matchmakers to positively
engage in two-way dialogue with HR practitioners, in order to modify discriminatory
recruitment processes that our study (and others) suggests significantly affect the recruitment
of disadvantaged candidates. Large employers may be more able to accommodate any
associated costs and risks of hiring such groups (Hasluck, 2011); however, other employers
may require more in-depth engagement from ALMP agencies to overcome these.
Matchmaking is likely to involve ALMP agencies better preparing candidates for employers’
recruitment processes. However, these LMIs must ensure that in the process they do not
perpetuate employers’ existing discriminatory behaviour (Bonet et al., 2013: 381) that may
undermine diversity (Coverdill and Finlay, 1998).
It is possible that the activities of ALMP agencies will only ever result in a re-shuffling of the
jobs queue (Peck and Theodore, 2000), and from our data, it is unclear how far employers’
recruitment of disadvantaged groups reflects this, or ALMP agencies’ strategies of ‘creaming’
of the most job-ready and ‘parking’ of those further from the labour market (Carter and
Whitworth, 2015). Additionally, although ALMPs in both countries aimed to incentivise
sustained employment, we do not know the extent to which the ALMP agencies in this study
were merely fulfilling employers’ short-term labour requirements (Gore, 2005) rather than
fostering sustained employment. Nevertheless, at the basic level of information provision,
ALMP agencies may lead to employers recruiting some disadvantaged candidates when they
would not otherwise have done so.
A key finding from our study concerns the inability of ALMPs to counteract employers’
selective hiring, which is detrimental to the probability of recruiting from disadvantaged
groups. However, the strategy of channelling large volumes of candidates to large employers
may prove less effective in the future, particularly if improved economic conditions result in
ALMP agencies having less ‘job-ready’ candidates on their books. As matchmaker LMIs,
ALMP agencies need to better account for the heterogeneity of employers by tailoring their
services to both employers and candidates. Extant research (Ingold and Stuart, 2014) has drawn
attention to the specific recruitment-related activities of ALMP agencies in their attempts to
engage employers. Although this study cannot make claims about the impact of these specific
activities, it may provide a foundation on which to build further research, including about the
role of firm size and turnover as under-explored criteria in the implementation of ALMPs.
Although employersmay potentially value theHR services and candidates provided byALMP
agencies, there currently exists a gulf that needs to be bridged between these agencies and HR
practitioners. Our study aims to draw attention to this under-explored dimension of HR
practice, which has the potential to contribute to the increased recruitment of marginalised
labour market groups and to enhance workforce diversity.
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